Breaking with the left, he has not undertaken major socioeconomic reforms and his anti-oligarchy rhetoric benefitted his cronies. Using nationalism to respond to global criticism, he put opponents on the defensive. His appeals resonated given the failures of liberal "reformism," with a "proletarian" populist alternative undermined. As president, Duterte nationalised the violent populism he had first developed locally which wooed rather than intimidated voters with promises to protect "good people" against drug-induced evil. Lastly, it presents three scenarios for resolving the territorial dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) between the Philippines and China: two with maximum gains for one country only, and a third with an acceptable result for both countries as a product of mutual concessions.Īmong contemporary illiberal populist leaders, only Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has instigated mass murder under the guise of a "war on drugs." Attributed to "penal populism," it must be explained why Duterte won the presidency despite limited concerns about crime, why he organised extrajudicial killings, and why this continued despite domestic and international criticism. It goes on to propose a theoretical model for identifying the linkages between elements of political economy and international security from the perspective of Brantly Womack's theory of asymmetry. Next, it presents various economic and political indicators of the shift in Filipino foreign policy under Duterte. ' It begins by discussing the model of asymmetric relations as a suitable framework for understanding relations between highly unequal states, and the concept of dual structural asymmetry as a means of theorising the triangular relations among the Philip-pines, the USA and China since the end of the Cold War. This article proposes a theoretical framework for understanding Filipino president Ro-drigo Duterte's celebrated 'pivot to China. In this context, the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership’s objective of promoting peace and stability in the SCS is operationalized by strengthening Manila’s maritime security posture through: 1) enhancing maritime domain awareness 2) conducting bilateral capacity-building initiatives and 3) coordinating measures in managing tensions at the multilateral level. In particular, this article seeks to address the following questions: (1) What is a strategic partnership? (2) Why is there a strategic imperative for the Philippines and Japan to forge such a partnership? and (3) How does the PJSPD bolster Manila’s maritime capabilities? Using the strategic partnership framework developed by Thomas Wilkins, this paper argues that Manila and Tokyo forged a strategic partnership largely because of their shared concern over the uncertainty in the regional security environment caused by China’s rise, as manifested by its increasing assertiveness in the SCS. This paper aims to discuss how the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership strengthens Manila’s maritime security posture in the SCS.
Inopportune acts, flawed policies, and mistimed moves may have fatal results.” The Philippines must always act with foresight, prudence, and flexibility in the realm of foreign policy because, as Kenneth Waltz argued, “eak states operate on narrow margins. While the Manila-Washington alliance is far from perfect, supporting continued US presence through the implementation of the VFA is consistent with the Philippines’ efforts in mitigating its geopolitical vulnerabilities. Hence, this paper concludes that the decision to abrogate the VFA is at variance with Philippine national security interests as a small power. Moreover, the decision also produced a cloud of uncertainty over the trajectory of the security relations with the Philippines’ strategic/comprehensive partners as the VFA termination raises the issue of reliability and credibility. Terminating the VFA would further unleash the remaining restraints to China’s maritime expansionist agenda and would help facilitate Beijing’s efforts to alter the status quo to its favor. Cognizant of their relative weakness, small powers favor the status quo order in order to, among others, broaden the diplomatic space for maneuver and choice, and expand the resources upon which they can use in times of stress.
Using a theoretical understanding of small power behavior, this paper examined the national security challenges posed by a potential abrogation of the VFA.
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